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Abstract
This  article  aims  to  explore  the  debate  on  human  enhancement  (HE)  from  the
perspective  of  the  evolutions  of  responsibility  paradigms,  and in  particular  from the
perspective of the so-called Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach. The
aim is not to explore the arguments pro or contra the ethical legitimacy and/or technical
feasibility of human enhancement, but rather exploring if, and how, RRI perspective can
shape the debate on human enhancement (and vice-versa). 
In particular, the human enhancement debate will be read through the lenses of four
main responsibility paradigms we sketch by examining both the historical and conceptual
evolution of the responsibility idea, as well as the dynamics of its ascription. In order to
provide a useful scheme for interpreting human enhancement, RRI will be characterised
as a distinctive responsibility model that can subsequently be used to frame the debate
on HE with a particular emphasis on its normative implications, as well as on its social
and political significance.
1. Introduction
The quest for the responsible development of science and innovation has a long history,
particularly within the technological field. In order to deal with the management of both
the  intended  and  unintended  outcomes  of  innovation,  many  approaches  have  been
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elaborated throughout the years. Methods and approaches such as the multiple variants
of  technology  assessment  and  stakeholder  engagement,  the  consideration  of  ethical,
legal and social implications of research (ELSA), and ‘midstream’ modulation of science
[1] are all attempts to translate the “responsibility” into the policy discourse on science
and technology. The more recent notion of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI)
can  be seen as  one of  these attempts.  However,  we believe  that  RRI  offers  a  more
ambitious  framework,  outlining  a  paradigmatic  shift  for  the  understanding  of
responsibility in science and technology governance.
Human Enhancement can be briefly characterised as “the intentional improvement of
individuals’ capacities with the help of technical or biomedical interventions in or on the
human  body”  [2]  (see  also  paragraph  3).  Shelley-Egan  and  others  methodologically
distinguish  between  “enhancements”  with  a  “small  e”  (those  already  existing)  and  a
“capital  E”  (speculation  about  the  future,  mainly  those  envisioned  by  transhumanist
discourse),  claiming  that  "the  debate  over  human  Enhancement  is  less  relevant  for
governance  of  current  research  and  innovation  pathways,  as  the  technologies  and
applications discussed are of a speculative nature" [3]
Whilst this approach can be accepted as a methodology for narrowing the scope of the
analysis,  this  separation cannot  be fully  maintained here,  as  human enhancement  is
intrinsically both normatively framed and ideologically charged. That is to say that the
discourse on HE (as the mentioned authors do recognise) is not a purely scientific one,
but is mainly a societal and political one. 
We argue that RRI is uniquely placed to address this social and political salience of HE,
insofar as it is an equally normatively and ideologically committed concept, which has
the ambition of steering the development of research and innovation in a manner that
would benefit society.
We should therefore (a) compare RRI with alternative responsibility paradigms (section
2);  (b)  examine  how  the  governance  of  human  enhancement  is  affected  by  those
paradigms in order to underline what the potentialities of RRI might be (section 3); and
finally, (c) explore how RRI is and can be influenced by the specificities of HE and its
discourse (section 4).
We should therefore (1)  locate RRI with respect  to different responsibility paradigms,
then (2) see how the governance of human enhancement is affected by those paradigms
in order  to stress what the potentialities of  RRI might be;  finally,  (3)  it  is  also worth
considering how the debate on HE can shape the debate on RRI and the understanding
of this notion.
2. Paradigms of responsibility
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The historical evolution of the notion of responsibility, particularly in the legal field, has
produced  different  paradigms.  The  different  meanings  of  responsibility  can  be
understood  by  organizing  them  around  two  distinct  modes  and  two  temporal
dimensions.
Regarding  the  modes,  we  can  distinguish  between  a  passive  and  an  active  sense  of
responsibility.  The  passive  pole  is  related  to  the  idea  of  being  held  responsible  by
somebody  else  (morally  or,  typically,  legally)  and  it  corresponds  to  the  idea  of  an
imputation of responsibility, where responsibility is understood as the obligation to bear
the consequences of an action (liability) or as the obligation to take into account one’s
duties  and  give  an  account  of  it  (accountability).  The  active  pole  of  the  idea  of
responsibility is linked to the idea of a voluntary  assumption of responsibility  without
relying on pre-established duties (unlike liability) nor waiting for ex post accounts (unlike
accountability); this anticipatory and active meaning of responsibility is captured by the
idea of  responsiveness, which shapes responsibility more in terms of a quality  or an
attitude than of a process or its outcome [4].
A second  crucial distinction for understanding the different meanings of responsibility
includes its axis of temporal directions, which can be retrospective or prospective [5]. 
Retrospective  responsibility  is  backward-looking,  i.e.  past-oriented,  and  is  essentially
linked to the  idea  of  a  reaction,  which shapes  the idea  of  responsibility  in  terms  of
sanction, compensation or justification, and is essentially linked to the ideas of liability
and accountability. 
Prospective responsibility is forward-looking, i.e. future-oriented, and is essentially linked
to  the  idea  of  assuming  and  actively  exercising  responsibility,  both  in  the  sense  of
complying with some duties, but also by (pro)actively assuming responsibilities when the
contents of our duties and tasks are not or cannot be established in advance. Taken in
this sense, responsibility is called “prospective”[6] in that responsibility is not an ex post
judgement over a certain state of affairs, but it concerns a possible future state of affairs.
Considering the two semantic poles we described above and the two temporal directions
underlying the different understandings of responsibility, different general paradigms of
responsibility can be distinguished according to their shifting logic and combination of
these elements. 
In particular, three main paradigms can be identified [7]:
(1)  The  paradigm  of  fault,  corresponding  to  the  traditional  moral  and  legal  idea  of
responsibility as linked to a faulty causation by the agent. This paradigm of responsibility
is essentially retrospective, as it is based on an ex post judgment on a past action (and
possibly on its sanction), and  passive  as somebody is made responsible by somebody
else.
(2)  The paradigm of  risk,  in  which  the legal  focus  of  responsibility  is  geared  toward
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guaranteeing victims against damages (without reference to individual fault) rather than
on  sanctioning  the  “responsible”  person(s),  whose  involvement  in  producing  or  not
producing the damage becomes irrelevant under the “objective” logic of compensation.
This  model  of  responsibility  is  indeed  prospective in  that  it  aims  to  anticipate  the
occurrence of  damages by means of risk management techniques,  and  active,  in the
sense that it favors risk anticipation through organisational measures and insurance.
(3) The paradigm of precaution, as a reaction to a situation of epistemic uncertainty that
cannot be domesticated by means of risk prevention. As the direct or indirect outcomes
of research and innovation practices cannot be fully anticipated (e.g. the effects of the
use of chemical products in agriculture and their effects on the ecosystem, the effects of
genetically modified organisms on the biosphere, etc.), it becomes crucial to anticipate
also  the  undesirable  outcomes  of  techno-scientific  activities.  This  paradigm  is  both
prospective, as it is oriented towards undetermined potentially negative effects which do
not  fall  within  the  two former  paradigms of  responsibility,  and  active as  it  requires
balancing both facts  (data)  and normative assumptions (values)  case-by-case,  without
certain and established criteria for fully objectively assessing the (marginal but relevant)
risks it addresses. This paradigm is linked to the idea of precaution, which emerged first
within ethical reflection [8] and which has subsequently been enacted as a legal principle,
initially in the form of soft law [9], and then as a general principle of European Union law
[10].
Within  those  paradigms,  different  meanings  of  the  word  “responsibility”  do  coexist.
Indeed responsibility has been defined as “a syndrome of concepts” [11]  to the degree
that nine different meanings of responsibility can be identified [12]. How is RRI located
amongst these paradigms? 
RRI admittedly aims to cope not only with uncertainty, but also with the indeterminacy of
the outcomes of innovation. It therefore aims to include the precautionary paradigm, but
also aims to improve it by relying mostly on the proactive and future-oriented senses of
responsibility. Despite its deliberate soft forms of institutionalisation, RRI presents some
distinctive  features.  Indeed,  a  common  understanding  of  RRI  emerges  across  the
different definitions, which use different terminology and have distinguished orientations
and focus, but share some common characteristics. These common characteristics can
therefore be identified as defining the core features of the concept of RRI [13] [14]:
a) Responsibility  is oriented towards the future rather than towards the past:  the
specific  approach  of  RRI  aims  to  steer  the  innovation  processes  from  within,
according to societal values and needs, which are held in common.
b) Responsibility  is  seen  as  a  collective  and  participative  process  shared  across
different  actors  with  different  roles  and  powers  along the innovation  process:
inclusion is therefore one of the most prominent dimensions of RRI. 
c) Responsibility  is  characterised  as  being  proactive  more  than  reactive,  as  it  is
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intended  mainly  as  a  driving  factor  of  innovation  processes  rather  than  as  a
remedy for their failures: “Responsible research and innovation involve proactively
seeking information about legal conduct as well as doing the right thing, whether
there is a compliance mechanism or not” [15].
d) The  most  challenging  and  problematic  characteristic  is  the  need  for  concrete
engagement by the relevant actors in RRI with societal stakeholders.
These characteristics, derived from its formulation, seem to make RRI stand apart from
the other  responsibility  paradigms,  as  it  combines  some of  their  elements  in  a  new
fashion. Indeed, RRI can perhaps be considered a new governance paradigm [13] that
goes beyond the traditional emphasis on fault and punishment, risk and compensation,
uncertainty and precaution,  as  it aims to  steer the innovation process from the inside
towards societal goals rather than coping with its (actual or anticipated) unwanted and
unintended  externalities  (see  Table  1).  RRI  aims  to  promote  the  integration  of  wide
societal concerns in research and innovation processes, thus widening their traditional
scopes and inscribing them into wider contexts. Moreover, RRI stipulates cooperation
between societal actors, hence it  is based on the responsibilisation of both innovators
and stakeholders,  promoting a  governance model  centered on the adoption  and the
practical  implementation  of  (self-)regulatory  instruments  such  as  codes  of  conduct,
guidelines, technical standards, reporting, and audits. In  this way, RRI comprehensively
combines and integrates various earlier approaches and methods, such as Technology
Assessment or the Precautionary Principle. The position and the relationship between
the different paradigms is illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1 HERE
These are the promises of RRI more than its reality. More than promises (or maybe we
should say  like promises), these are indeed the normative features of RRI – that is, the
features required in order to realise RRI in practice. The distance between the rhetoric of
all  the  responsibility  discourses  and their  realisation  can  nevertheless  be great.  This
distance makes its normative implications even stronger. This is to say that despite the
many resources and tools for realising it already provided by many EC funded programs,
which  could  lead  to  a  successful  codification  and  practical  implementation  of  the
paradigm, RRI is still  in  its  infancy and the force of its  declared ambitions has to be
widened  and  reaffirmed  if  we  really  want  to  take  seriously  its  promises  and  not
accommodate the unavoidable rhetoric accompanying its practical implementations.
I suggest that a demanding and challenging subject such as HE has the twofold effect of
stimulating an explicit assessment of RRI implications and, at the same time, of clarifying
its claims and promises. In other words, both ideas assert many promises for the future:
RRI could be, in principle, the governance model of HE, and indeed it also looks to be the
one with greater potentialities, both for the perspectives it opens and for managing the
state-of-the-art of the already ongoing HE interventions and technologies, as there are
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already some practical  implementations of HE which RRI could provide a governance
framework for.
But, as we shall see, this relation could also be inverted: in being a projection over the
future with definite and ambitious aims and means, HE somehow forces RRI to better
define its aims and simultaneously to raise its expectations and demands. 
The fourth element characterising RRI highlighted by Wickson and Forsberg [1], namely
the willingness of the actors involved to both  act  and  adapt  according to the central
features characterising RRI, shows the frailty of this idea and its subsequent vulnerability.
Indeed, being that RRI is essentially dependent more on voluntary commitments and soft
regulatory measures rather than on formal regulations makes it more vague and unsure
as a normative standard. At the same time, this constitutes its appeal and its potential
strength, and this could be a key element for its success, as it allows for some leeway in
its implementation, which could be advantageous in allowing for its adoption by a larger
audience. This uncertain regulatory status is linked to the problematic normative status
of a soft form of regulation considered not only in itself but also in its relationships and
interactions with formal (“hard”) regulation [16].
3. Responsibility  paradigms  and  the  governance  of
Human Enhancement
In this section, we discuss the impact that different responsibility paradigms can have on
the governance of human enhancement techniques or, put another way, we explore the
merits of each paradigm in the governance of HE. It will be argued that RRI could be a
good candidate for the governance of HE, but only if some non-obvious conditions are
met. Firstly it is necessary to clarify what HE refers to:
"Human enhancement,  also  called  human augmentation,  is  an  emerging field  within
medicine  and  bioengineering  that  aims  to  develop  technologies  and  techniques  for
overcoming  current  limitations  of  human  cognitive  and  physical  abilities  [...]  human
enhancement technologies [...] [are] techniques that improve human functions beyond a
normal range" [17]. 
HE intervenes on fundamental human capacities,  be they at the physical or cognitive
level,  which poses problems in terms of responsibility,  necessitating an ethical  and a
legal framing. One of the main issues is the evaluation of the intrinsic merits and the
limits of HE, which are far from being uncontroversial.
In turn, given that it affects basic human capacities, HE may alter agency and therefore is
likely  to  induce  some  changes  in  both  the  distribution  and  the  attribution  of
responsibility.  By directly affecting the expectations and roles of the different societal
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actors, this in turn redefines the terms of the implicit “social contract” between science
and society [18].
Here  we  shall  consider  HE  as  an  object  of  responsibility,  while  in  the  next  we  will
consider responsibility as an object of HE.
In  this  sense,  it  seems clear  that  the paradigm of  fault  and that  of  risk  are  obvious
candidates for regulating HE-related activities: the use of techniques with effects that are
not fully known, or exposing “patients” to possible long-term damages do advocate for
the use of liability and that of risk management, depending on the situation. Therefore,
in principle, those regulatory techniques can be applied to HE just as they are to the
medical profession.
Nevertheless,  both techniques presuppose a well-established balance of  values,  rules
and knowledge which is so far lacking in the HE domain, since:
a) HE merits are contested according to different value options (strongly promoted by
transhumanists but contested by others on the basis of a different scale of values);
b) consequences and side-effects of HE techniques, especially in the long term, are not
yet well known (for instance, if we think of the long-term effects of off-label prescription
drugs);
c) the boundaries of HE cannot be drawn in a clear manner between what can be labelled
as enhancement and what cannot be labelled as such, so that the distinction becomes
slippery.
These  features,  along  with  the  implicit  or  explicit  promises  of  a  better  future
accompanying HE, do require a prospective governance approach focusing on societal
values, rather than a reactive one. This perspective corresponds with forward-looking
responsibility  approaches,  namely  the Precautionary  Principle  and RRI  (only  if  “taken
seriously,” as we will argue).
We shall briefly discuss their merits and their limits as governance models for HE.
Despite being a future-oriented responsibility model, the Precautionary Principle is still
conceived of and used as a remedy when the consequences of innovation may be in
conflict with the wealth or even the survival of society. In my opinion, what distinguishes
the Precautionary Principle from RRI is not its inner logic, which is that of the anticipation
of responsibility and its extension also to the broad non-measurable consequences of
innovation, nor its underpinned epistemology, which ultimately in both cases is linked to
a  context  of  epistemic  uncertainty,  but  rather  –  and  crucially  –  to  its  context  of
application.
Indeed,  the  Precautionary  Principle  has  been  conceived  as  an  anticipatory  remedy
against the undesirable outcomes of innovation activities, either by inverting, diverting or
blocking their path, thus remaining somehow in a context in which positions obey an
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adversarial logic.
Instead,  RRI  aims  to  bring  the  anticipatory  logic  of  precaution  into  the  context  of
cooperation between innovators and society. What specifically distinguishes RRI from the
Precautionary  Principle  is  the  integration  of  an  anticipatory  precautionary  approach
within the innovation process.
What  distinguishes  the two approaches,  therefore,  is  not  primarily  their  "functioning
principle"  (by  which  I  mean  their  basic  epistemology  and  their  inner  logic),  but  the
quality of the context: the real novelty of RRI as a governance approach is not to be
found in its epistemological stance, but rather in the attempt to shape a different context
of actors involved, values considered, timing and place of decision, etc.
The alleged political nature of the Precautionary Principle determines its force, making it
quite controversial as a legal principle. That feature is precisely what RRI takes and brings
to another context, which can be characterised by the cooperation between science and
society (to put it simply) and not by their confrontation.
This shift does not require the shaping of new principles. It requires the shaping of new
power relations, i.e. changing the equilibrium between the forces of science and society
we  have  so  far  [19].  This  is  more  of  a  cultural  and  political  change  than  a  purely
ethical/legal issue, and therefore is harder to achieve. This also explains the relevance of
the fourth element stressed by Wickson and Forsberg [1] in summarizing the essential
features of RRI :
1. A specific focus on addressing significant societal needs and challenges
2. A research and development process that actively engages and responds to a
range of stakeholders
3. A concerted effort to anticipate potential problems, identify alternatives, and
reflect on underlying values, and
4. A willingness from relevant actors to act and adapt according to 1–3.
It  is  precisely  this last  element that  shows how RRI is  linked essentially  to voluntary
measures and how it is shaped by the creation of a cultural context that includes law
(and which is formed and conditioned also by law) but that cannot be identified in a set
of rules and principles. The common defining features of such approaches are: (a) their
non-mandatory  nature  (i.e.  the  fact  that  they do not  generate  legal  obligations),  but
nevertheless (b) the fact that they contain commitments that go beyond existing legal
requirements or regulatory standards. 
The  coupling  between  those  two  characteristics  puts  RRI  in  an  ambitious  and  yet
problematic position, which is that of aiming to pursue genuinely  political  goals (in the
broad sense of the definition of the conditions for living together in society) through
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voluntary  measures.  In  other  words,  RRI  implies:  (a)  the  assumption  of  obligations
without coercion and (b) outside the institutional spheres of political representation.
Whilst the non-coerced assumption of obligations has been widely discussed and the
various  voluntary  instruments  used  for  implementing  some  regulatory  standards
explored,  the  relationship  between  RRI  and  political  representation  deserves  closer
attention, as it requires examining its normative implications, be they explicit or implicit.
With regard to the former, several practical instruments have been in place for decades,
for  instance,  under  the  label  of  Corporate  Social  Responsibility,  with  its  methods  of
practical implementation that seem to be appropriate to implementing RRI in practice.
Voluntary approaches include a broad spectrum of possible arrangements spanning from
industry self-regulation to negotiated agreements between government and industry (co-
regulation).
Besides those self-regulatory instruments, a wide typology of tools specifically aimed at
implementing RRI in practice is available; many of these tools have been developed in
the FP7 European Union-funded programs specifically dealing with RRI. Concerning in
particular the issues of identifying and managing responsibility in RRI, we could mention
the  “Responsibility  Navigator”  [20]  (to  cite  one  belonging to  the very  first  stream of
projects dealing with the definition of RRI, its scope and its ambitions, and which was
elaborated via a ‘co-construction method’), which aims to supporting participating actors
in identifying, developing and implementing RRI measures in specific contexts. In order
to do so, the Responsibility Navigator provides some entry points to the fundamental
questions of responsibility, which by definition are contested, as they involve multiple
actors with different (when not conflicting) points of view [21]. Following that first stream,
other  projects  that  have  been  funded aim to  develop  instruments  and  tools  [22]  to
translate RRI into concrete practices in different fields such as industry [23] or higher
education [24]. the merits or demerits of which still remain to be assessed.
With regard to RRI and political representation, it is necessary to examine the conditions
for a non-unilateral setting of reference values, standards and practices, which points at
another issue  à la page nowadays: that of stakeholders'  engagement in research and
innovation processes.
Stakeholders'  engagement  is  undoubtedly  required  for  a  successful  allocation  of
responsibilities,  but  nevertheless  it  is  not  sufficient  in  itself  to  grant  an  acceptable
balance between societal goals and economic impacts: RRI cannot be based solely on
voluntary instruments and there is a need to blend regulatory flexibility with democratic
safeguards [25]. 
The need for a “democratization” of research and innovation is a consequence of the
changed relationship between science and society: as long as science is producing rather
than reducing uncertainty, and as long as that affects some essential aspects of our living
in societies, the scientific and the political debate become intertwined; the augmented
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risks cannot be addressed only through expertise or technological applications, so that
managing  uncertainty  is  no  longer  a  prerogative  of  public  decision-makers,  and  the
decision-making  processes  requires  more  transparency  and  public  participation  [26].
Indeed there is a serious power imbalance between the general public (stakeholders) on
one side and innovators and policy-makers on the other side, which has to be taken into
account when advocating for public participation and deliberation in policy-making and
in setting the research agenda.
The rationale behind the inclusion of societal actors in science [27] is that of filling a
double  gap  between  scientific  innovation  and  society,  namely  that  concerning  the
production of  knowledge,  and that  concerning the legitimacy of  the choices that  are
made. Increasing the democratic nature of innovation process governance is not only a
matter of facilitating representativeness within the participatory processes, but also of
overcoming a reductive framing of societal issues in participation initiatives [28]. Indeed
participatory  approaches  cannot  grant  a  qualitatively  better  decision-making  by
themselves:
“Participation as such does not insure an automatic positive outcome of the process. The
genuineness and efficacy of this idea depends basically on who participates (and how)
and on the link between participation and the decision-making process” [29].
The issue, in sum, is not whether the public should have a say in technical decisions, but
how to promote more meaningful interaction among policy-makers, scientific experts,
corporate producers, and the public [27]. 
Therefore,  if  we  want  to  give  credit  to  RRI  as  a  new  governance  approach,  and  in
particular  to  its  endeavour  of  attempting  to  add  morally  and  politically  relevant
functionality to the innovation process [30], I think that RRI has to acquire a stronger
constitutional identity [31].
We therefore have to maintain that RRI aims at creating an agora for the science-society
debate, which constitutes its genuinely political mark: “the agora is a domain of primary
knowledge production – through which people enter the research process” [32]. Along
with  these  premises,  it  is  possible  to  group  the  various  definitions  of  RRI  and  to
distinguish two fundamental ways of approaching and constructing this notion, each of
them with definite features and normative implications. The literature therefore has to
differentiate between a “socio-empirical” and a “normative” approach to RRI [33]. 
In the socio-empirical definitions of RRI, values and goals are the result of a contextual
consensus, which does not provide a stable normative anchoring for RRI governance;
within this framing, there is no remedy internal to RRI that can correct possible contrasts
with fundamental rights, which appear to have a weak status. 
This is  the reason why more  normatively oriented versions of  RRI seem to be more
convincing,  especially  in  light  of  the declared aims and ambitions of  the RRI  idea.  A
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normative approach maintains the necessity of guaranteeing fundamental rights, which
are  not  only  part  of  the  Rule  of  Law,  but  also  belong  widely  to  the  legacy  of  the
contemporary European philosophical, political and legal culture [34]. Therefore the high
political ambitions of the RRI idea – if taken seriously, according to its definitions and to
the benefits proclaimed by the European Commission (EC) – require reference to values
belonging  to  the  constitutional  traditions  of  European  countries,  in  particular  those
embedded in  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European Union and in  the
European Convention on Human Rights. 
The  reference  to  fundamental  rights  protection  should  not  be  seen  as  a  ‘threat  of
adjudication’ once removed from the ‘threat of regulation’, but rather as a reference to a
common level of protection within the European Union.
It follows that voluntary (self-)regulatory initiatives should grant a level of protection of
fundamental rights compatible with the current standards defined at the European level
(both by the European Union and by the Council of Europe, as specified and integrated
by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human
Rights).  The reference made to human rights does not imply taking societal goals and
values as fixed once and for all in advance and outside of society; indeed the content of
fundamental rights is subject to contextual specification and actualization over time. 
The inclusive dimension of RRI is called on precisely to structure the disagreements and
conflicts between different (if not diverging) interpretations of fundamental rights and
disputes about finding the correct balance between them. 
Therefore, the integration of Human Rights within RRI is precisely what can characterise
RRI as a distinctive governance approach to the management of the responsibilities of
research and innovation – at least if we want to take it seriously and give credit to its
ambitions. Otherwise the risk would be that “the undirected disposability of purposes
can  create  the  risk  that  RRI  could  be  realised  in  ways  that  de  facto  contradict  its
premises,  thus  becoming  worthless  rhetoric  or  an  instrument  for  covering  purposes
other than its authentic promises” [6]. 
Therefore, a major implication of adopting an RRI governance approach for HE is that of
inscribing the questions of Enhancement in a wider societal perspective: "bringing an RRI
lens to the context of use of prescription drugs for cognitive enhancement can contribute
to raising the level of discussion from individual level to collective or societal level to
consider both societal needs and expectations and implications for society" [3]. 
The adoption of an RRI perspective therefore demands us to evaluate the specific merits
of HE in the societal context, in particular assessing if, and how, it can respond to societal
needs and challenges. RRI can add a multifaceted perspective to its analysis, challenging
HE underlying values and asserted benefits,  and shifting the discourse from concrete
enhancing techniques to the factors and values that both drive HE and are promoted by
such discourse (e.g. competitiveness).
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If we examine the features of RRI, it is worth noting how many of them (if not all) are
intended  to  shape  the  context  of  the  debate:  a  commitment  to  openness  and
transparency,  ensuring  pluralism  through  stakeholder  engagement;  promoting
anticipation and reflection on actions and values; encouraging responsiveness, conceived
as an attention to the various, and often conflicting, normative assumptions of societal
actors.  Significantly,  the  analysis  of  the  merits  of  RRI  for  the  governance  of  Human
Cognitive Enhancement (HCE)  [3]  has pointed to the potential  contribution of  HCE in
solving societal challenges, which precisely reflects the intrinsic political nature of RRI.
Whilst  I  do  share  these  conclusions,  I  think  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  implicit
assumptions behind them, namely the reasons why we should give RRI a chance and
consider RRI capable of tackling such a demanding task.
In this sense, taking the HE debate seriously implies taking RRI seriously in turn – that is
to say, specifying the normative requirements not only implied by the RRI model, but
also those that it would be reasonable to expect from RRI, if it has to be given such a
credit  and  a  role.  In  other  words,  this  implies  (re)constructing  some  more  precise
normative implications of RRI that could be derived from its definitions and the roles it is
called to fulfil, according to the rhetoric accompanying it.
As  for  our  present  discussion,  the  interaction  of  HE  with  the different  responsibility
paradigms will be the object of the subsequent section.
4. Human Enhancement influence on RRI
In this section, I will try to illustrate how human enhancement can affect responsibility,
and in particular, the pivotal elements of each responsibility model. Indeed, it  seems
clear  that  HE  can  affect  all  the  responsibility  paradigms  as  it  has  the  potential  to
significantly  influence their  inner  logic  and mechanisms,  altering the way they  work.
Human enhancement has a direct impact on the established criteria of responsibility that
we find, for instance, in law as – by definition – enhancement techniques do intervene on
the basic  elements  defining  human capacity,  therefore  affecting  the process  of  both
ascribing responsibilities  ex ante  and evaluating or judging responsibilities  ex post. As
normal bodily or mental functions are augmented, the question of the threshold used for
ascribing and evaluating responsibility  has to be questioned across the paradigms of
fault, risk, and precaution.
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fault 
The  paradigm  of  fault  follows  the  idea  that  responsibility  depends  on  capacity  and
causality [35]. In particular, responsibility is ascribed to a capable person if there is a
causal link between their action and the occurrence of an event (there is never ascription
of responsibility  without capacity,  whilst  the ascription of liability  without causality  is
possible as an exception). Within this framing, it is clear that HE interferes with the very
basic conditions of responsibility, and in particular as the augmentation of the bodily or
mental  function  claims  to  also  be  an  enhancement  of  capacity,  the  question  arises
whether  this  should  justify  increasing  or  decreasing  the  responsibility  threshold.
Therefore, both bodily and cognitive enhancement seem to directly affect responsibility,
namely regarding the ascription of duties and the imputation of liabilities. Indeed, as
“responsibility  follows  capacity,”  a  possible  “natural”  consequence  would  be  that  of
expecting more from people with higher capacities, therefore ascribing to them higher
responsibilities  than  to  “ordinary”  people.  
This is not the right place to discuss the issue extensively, but it is worth highlighting
some  problems  it  presents:  whether  discriminating  “enhanced”  persons  would  be
justified and fair; who should determine the higher threshold, and how; and what kind of
responsibilities we might expect from enhanced individuals. 
The  problem  is  therefore  whether  it  would  be  justified  to  impose  new  (and  more
demanding)  duties  on  “enhanced”  people,  in  particular  when  cognitive  enhancement
interventions  are  deliberately  taken  in  the  context  of  highly  specialized  professional
practices  (i.e.  surgery)  for  the  purpose  of  minimizing  the  risk  of  bad  outcomes  or
increasing the success rate of their intervention [36]. 
Indeed it seems that the creation of new specific duties is currently thought of as being
problematic more for reasons linked to the reliability of the enhancement techniques
(e.g  their  long-term  side  effects)  than  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  expectations.  At  the
opposite end, it appears that some expectations about the duty to enhance for some
professionals  in  some circumstances  are  likely  to  arise  in  a  near  future  [37],  as  the
standard responsibility threshold might be affected by the evolution of capacities linked
to HE techniques.  Without engaging in an extensive debate over the issue here,  it  is
worthy observing that RRI could have effects precisely on the definition of the legitimacy
of  those  expectations:  while  acknowledging  that  capacities  are  defined  only  by  the
measure of a bodily or mental function (which is an issue to be discussed, as it is not self-
evident),  it  remains  that  normative  expectations  are,  or  should  be,  also  societally-
defined. Therefore, the contribution of an RRI approach in this sense would be that of
questioning, in the sense of opening the debate on a public level regarding the implicit or
explicit normative expectations about HE and enhanced individuals.
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risk
Enhancement techniques could have effects on risk-management techniques, both in the
sense of decreasing some risks by virtue of the enhanced capacities, and of increasing
other risks for the same reason. More specifically, for example, cognitive enhancement
techniques on some professionals (e.g. in the medical profession) – that can augment
some capacities like concentration or resistance to stress – could help lower the risk of
mistakes, thus decreasing the risk of compensation. On the other hand, as the long-term
effects of some enhancement techniques are not well-known yet, the risk to health of the
enhanced individuals could be increased.  
As  risk  can  only  be  distributed  but  never  eliminated,  the  reasons  behind  the  re-
distributions of damages between the individuals (a damage not compensated) and the
society (compensation of damages suffered by individuals on the basis of an insurance
system) must to be subject to public scrutiny, as they shape an “equilibrium between
social forces” in society, which in turn depends on some fundamental societal values (as
we will discuss later, this is one of the reasons that could count in favour of an RRI-based
approach to HE). A risk-based approach to responsibility could lead to justifying both
the  imposition  of  special  enhancement  duties  on  certain  professionals  in  order  to
increase the benefits for society.
precaution
Unlike  the  risk-based  approach,  the  precautionary  approach  does  not  require  the
certainty of a causal link between the action or the event and the possible harm, as it
intervenes  on non-measurable  risks  and on uncertain  causal  links:  “according to the
precautionary principle, lack of scientific certainty about the potential harm should no
longer constitute an obstacle for risk-preventive actions” [38].
It seems to me that HE can interfere with the precautionary approach, as it could alter
the evaluation of the unforeseeable consequences that the principle deals with, as well
as the horizon of solutions available for damage recovery. The proactive, interventionist
approach of HE can influence risk assessment and alter the evaluation of uncertainty.
Unpredictability  can  be  seen  as  an  opportunity,  unforeseen  events  as  occasions  to
exploit by using HE techniques [39]. In this way, the precautionary approach could be
undermined by de-potentiating both its logical foundations and its intended effects.
RRI
The RRI  discourse  is  imbued with a  specific  rhetoric  of  responsibility  that  has many
aspects:  the  commitment  towards  societal  goals,  openness  and  participation,  and
reflexivity and responsiveness, to cite the more relevant ones. The relationship between
HE and RRI seems to be complex and ambiguous. It  is true that the RRI paradigm is
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based,  albeit  non-exclusively,  on  voluntary  measures  going  beyond  duties  that  are
mandated by law, as we have noted before. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider that
RRI is not an individual form of responsibility, but a collective one, and the core of RRI is
the creation of a context of participation and discussion about societal values [25]. In this
sense, the capacities to be enhanced are considered from the viewpoint of their ethical,
legal and political significance, rather than from the perspective of the specific bodily and
cognitive alterations they entail. 
It appears therefore that if HE has an impact on RRI, it is not in the sense of altering the
functioning of its constitutive elements, but rather that of pushing RRI to be more explicit
about its intrinsic normative commitments at the ethical, political and legal level.
Without revoking the voluntary nature of the rules and standards through which RRI is
mainly realised (as it is realised essentially through soft law and self-regulatory tools),
nevertheless  we can maintain  that  RRI  is  a  fundamentally  normative  concept,  which
poses the need for a normative steering of research and innovation oriented towards the
achievement of fundamental societal goals, revealing its underlying political nature.
In the EU context, stressing the political nature of RRI means giving it not only scope but
also content in line with European political values, which can be summarised by the Rule
of Law and the protection and promotion of Human Rights.
This political significance of RRI does require reference to some common values defining
some fundamental  features  of  society  and  polity.  These  values  can  be  found in  the
principle of the Rule of Law, which is part of the legal-political heritage of many European
countries, and in the protection of Human rights, in particular those embedded in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European Convention
on Human Rights. 
This  is  a  crucial  element,  as  it  provides  a  solid  normative  framing  for  RRI  without
silencing the controversies around values, which are at the core of RRI as a governance
approach:  as  there  is  not  a  stable  hierarchy  between  them,  and  it  is  necessarily  a
contextual balancing in each case,  the conditions for their compression cannot be left
purely to a contingent consensus between innovators and stakeholders.
Therefore the reference to fundamental rights is necessary in order to frame the context
of  the  values  implied  by  RRI,  and  the  subsequent  reference  to  the  Charter  of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union is justified both as it has been produced in
the context of the European Union and because the content of the rights have been
updated according to changes in society, as well as social progress and scientific and
technological developments (particularly recognising data protection as an autonomous
fundamental right beyond privacy), which seems to fit with the RRI idea. 
The reference to fundamental rights protection therefore should be seen as reference to
a common level of protection of fundamental values within the European Union. The
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content those values assume in different contexts should certainly be specified through
participatory processes, but also through the case-law of the European Court of Justice
and that of the European Court of Human Rights, which could define the standards of
their protection and the limits and conditions of their limitation.
The  role  played  by  horizontal  dynamics  between  fundamental  rights  in  this  sense
appears crucial. In this sense, the inclusive deliberation processes advocated by RRI are
called upon to structure the conflict of interpretations between fundamental rights, the
content  of  which  is  subject  not  only  to  contextual  specifications,  but  also  has  to  be
actualized over time: the integration of fundamental rights into research and innovation
could also help reduce the risk of adverse technology reception by society, effectively
playing the steering function expected from a governance model. 
5. Final thoughts
This paper argues that RRI seems better suited than other governance models to address
the issues raised by HE. To do so, RRI should, however, be taken “seriously”. We believe
this means that, in the EU context, RRI should be explicitly anchored in human rights and
their  legal  instruments,  according  to  what  I  called  a  "constitutional  identity"  of  RRI.
Indeed, a normatively-framed version of RRI seems to grant flexibility on one side, but
within a framework of rights and duties. Actually, the integration of Human Rights within
governance  mechanisms  and  instruments  can  be  seen  precisely  as  the  element
characterising  RRI  as  a distinctive  governance approach compared to other  forms of
governance, if we want to give credit to its ambitions [6]. 
From  this  viewpoint,  we  can  certainly  maintain  that  inclusion,  and  in  particular
stakeholder  participation,  is  undoubtedly  an  essential  feature  of  RRI,  but  inclusion
cannot and should not overcome the reference to fundamental rights, in particular those
more closely associated with a collective dimension.
This  approach  is  relevant  to  HE,  as  it  seems  that  it  is  not  possible  to  separate
enhancement from its framing in terms of values, be they explicit or implicit. Like RRI, HE
is inherently political in nature. Taking for granted its premises and promises is a political
stance in  itself.  Therefore,  given  the  nature  and the  width  of  its  actual  or  potential
impacts on society, its merits and limits must be subject both to the possibility of public
scrutiny and to subsequent approval or refusal.
RRI  has  the  potential,  if  taken  seriously  as  an  explicitly  normative  governance
mechanism, to steer the debate on the fundamental, normative assumptions of HE. In
turn,  the  intrinsically  political  and  ideological  nature  of  HE  makes  the  apparently
idealistic  ambitions  and  features  of  RRI  as  essential  elements  of  the  responsible
governance model which HE requires.
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Tab. 1 - RRI and other responsibility paradigms
Paradigm  Time orientation Mode Criterion Mean Target Regulatorymechanism
fault retrospective passive(subjection) liability sanction
negative
outcomes hard law
risk prospective active(anticipative) risk-assessment compensation
negative
outcomes hard law
precaution prospective active (preventive) deliberation  expertise
negative
outcomes hard law, soft law
RRI prospective active(proactive) responsiveness participation
negative and
positive outcomes
self-regulation,
hard law, soft law
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